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MONETARY POLICY CREDIBILITY: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE NETHERLANDS1 
§ 1 Introduction 
* Since Fellner (1976) introduced the credibility concept in macroeconomics, there has been a 
continuing interest in its theoretical underpinnings and its empirical applications (for a survey 
see Blackburn & Christensen, 1989 and Persson & Tabellini, 1990). This paper tries to give 
some insight in the credibility of Dutch monetary policy makers. The so-called credibility-
hypothesis states that economie policy is more effective if the public believe in it. The costs of a 
disinflation pohcy for example are lower if the pubhc has confidence the initial policy will be 
maintained. A credible policy means that expectations will adjust faster. As a result the 
Phillipscurve shifts more quickly downward giving a recession a mild and short-term character. 
In this paper we introducé the credibüity-hypothesis for a related field i.e. exchange 
rate policy. We will concentrate on the role of the Dutch exchange rate regime in the explanati-
on of the Dutch-German interest rate differential. Specifically we will ask ourselves if the policy 
of shadowing the Deutsche mark since the start of the EMS contributed to a narrowing of the 
guiider-mark interest rate differential. After all, this is what the EMS discipline hypothesis 
implies. It is argued that the (quasi) fixed exchange rate regime of the EMS works as an anchor 
and introduces inflationary discipline at a lower cost than would be possible otherwise (Giavazzi 
& Pagano, 1988). So interest rates, being very sensitive to changes in market expectations, will 
fall in those countries which abide the EMS rules because their authorities perceive a devaluati-
on to be costly. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the macroeconomic background 
for the pohcy pursued by the Dutch authorities, in section 3 we focus in more detail on the 
credibüity-hypothesis. In section 4 we divert on the theoretical specification which we will 
estimate in section 5. Our results will be put in a broader framework in section 6 by comparing 
them with other empirical findings. Finally, section 7 presents our conclusions. 
§ 2 Economie background 
Recently Secretary of Finance Wim Kok formulated the Dutch exchange rate policy as follows: 
"...Dutch monetary policy will continue to focus on the fundamental strongest currency within the 
EMS. If the Federal Republic of Germany continues to pursue price stability after the German 
unification the fixed peg between the guilder and the Deutsche mark will be maintained (Kok, 
1990). From the beginning of the eigthies De Nederlandsche Bank (i.e. the Dutch central bank, 
abbr. DNB) stresses that the aim of exchange rate policy is to stimulate confidence in the Dutch 
guilder (Timmerman, 1982, p. 185). On the longer term this confidence will make a relatively 
lower interest rate possible (Szasz, 1981, p. 321). Although pegging to the Deutsche mark 
because of the low inflation reputation of the Bundesbank may now seem a sensible pohcy, it 
did not take that central place in most EMS countries for many years. Even the Netherlands 
were not an exception. For example, since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 the 
guilder was devalued several times against the Deutsche mark. Moreover, in the seventies Dutch 
policy makers never said a word about confidence aspects. 
In the remaining of this section we will bring to the fore the Dutch considerations 
basic to realignments of the par value of the guilder in the EMS and its predecessor the Snake 
Arrangement. Sometimes we will quote the policymakers. This is done on the one hand to signal 
the policy shift in the Netherlands and on the other hand to show the influence of policy 
i announcements on market expectations. 
The author wishes to thank Frank den Butter, Eelke de Jong, Rick VanderPloeg, Hans 
Visser and Nout Wellink for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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§ 2.1 The Snake Arrangement (1972-1979) 
The Netherlands fearing not without reason that universal free floating might undermine 
countries' domestic economie discipline, had joined the Snake from its very start in 1972 (Den 
Dunnen, 1979, p. 46). Especially the participation of Germany, with its traditional aversion to 
inflation, should be mentioned in this respect. Moreover, two-third of Dutch national income is 
exported to Snake member-countries, implying that external trade could benefit from rather 
stable exchange rates. 
The experience of the Dutch economy during the seventies looked like the text book 
case of an high open economy facing external shocks, while the internal situation was characte-
rized by structural rigidities. Increasing unit labour costs supported by wage indexation, led to a 
continuing profit erosion of the business sector, culminating in a post-war record low of the 
capital income ratio of 8% in 1982. As an effect unemployment rosé sharply. Partly because of 
the first oil-crisis a dangerous wage-price spiral came into life, inducing the monetary authorities 
to admit this being far outside their control. Further, partly as a result of cyclical movements, 
the government deficit rosé to unprecedented heights after 1978, tempting the government to 
monetary financing. Moreover, this source of money creation thwarted monetary policy which 
since 1977 imposed credit ceilings upon the banking system to stem their credit expansion. Table 
1 summerizes some macroeconomic developments. 
Table 1 Comparative macroeconomic performance 
1968-72 1973-78 1979-88 1968-73 1974-79 1980-88 
Real GDP Unemployment rate 
Netherlands 4.9 2.7 
EEC 4.9 2.5 
1.3 
2.0 
1.5 4.9 
2.9 4.8 
9.9 
9.7 
Consumer prices Current balance as Z of GDP 
Ne therland s 6.9 7.2 
EEC 6.2 12.3 
3.0 
7.7 
0.9 1.2 
0.7 -0.3 
2.4 
-0.1 
General government 
lending as Z of GDF 
net Current receipts of government 
as a Z of GDP 
Ne therland s 0.5 2.3 
EEC 0.7 3.6 
5.7 
4.7 
43.5 49.8 
35.8 38.8 
53.6 
42.7 
source: OECD Historical Statistics, 1960-1988 
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The current account however created a comfortable impression during the first part of the 
seventies. It moved into sizeable surplus in 1972-1973 when public and private investments 
showed a sharp lower growth rate. The surplus continued when the contribution of natural gas 
more than doubled in the wake of the huge oil-price increases. Only in 1977 did the deteriorati-
on of the Dutch (non-gas) business sector show up in a sharp reduction of the current account 
surplus, moving into deficit the next year. 
Given these developments it is not surprising that the monetary authorities assigned 
high priority to the fight against inflation (the Bank Act prescripes the central bank to secure 
the internal and external value of the guilder). Maintaining international competitiveness of 
Dutch products was mostly second in rank. Boti considerations however were central points in 
currency realignments. Thus when in September 1973 the guilder was revalued by 5% 2 the 
central bank aimed at breaking inflation expectations to avoid play at leapfrog of wages and 
prices (DNB Quarterly Report 1973/3, p. 66). In the long run the Netherlands Bank expected 
the revaluation would improve competitiveness. However in 1976 and 1978 the guilder was 
devalued again vis è vis the Deutsche mark, both times by 2%. Both devaluations were preceded 
by an effective appreciation of the guilder, making the net effect on the domestic price level 
small. Although the central bank worried about Dutch competitiveness, she dismissed a lowering 
of the effective exchange rate as a remedy. Given the country's openness and its institutionalized 
wage indexation an effective depreciation would not lead to a sustained improvement of 
international competitiveness. Only a lowering of inflation could strenghten the external perfor-
mance (DNB Quarterly Report 1978/3, p. 46). 
In sum, we can say that the effective exchange rate of the guilder was the central 
indicator to measure both the consequences for the rate of inflation as for external competitive-
ness during the Snake: ".... the effective results of parity adjustments of the guilder against our 
major trading partners should be within narrow limits" (DNB, Quarterly Report 1978/3, p. 46). 
Because those two goals might of course conflict, the fight against inflation could not receive top 
priority in all circumstances. In fact it did not. It is well known that the guilder devalued against 
the Deutsche mark everv time the mark was explicitly revalued in the Snake against the other 
currencies (see Table 2). 
Table 2 Guilder-Deutsche mark exchange rates in the Snake Arrangement 
April 1972 start Snake 
March 1973 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 3% 3 
June 1973 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 5Vi% 
Sept. 1973 Guilder revalues against Deutsche mark by 5% 
Oct. 1976 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 2% 
Oct. 1978 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 2% 
March 1979 start EMS 
Note: On its turn the guilder revalued in the above realignments against the French franc 
and the Scandinavian currencies. 
Fase & den Butter (1977) reached the same conclusion. They studied the endogeneity of Dutch 
monetary policy and found that both the discount rate and credit ceilings strongly reacted on 
cyclical variations in the unemployment rate. The inflation rate however exerted a weak 
influence. The authorities thus opted for a compromise. The desire to avoid a short-term 
This was a lagged reaction on the revaluation of the German mark in June of the 
same year by 5V2%. 
Without specifying its motives the Dutch government came to the conclusion there was 
no reason to follow the German revaluation by 3% (DNB Quarterly Report 1973/1). 
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competitive disadvantage may have played an important part in successive devaluations. In sum, 
stickmg to a fixed peg with the Deutsche mark because of, what we now call establishing a 
reputation, was not an aim of Dutch exchange rate policy in the Snake. However things would 
change soon in the EMS. 
§ 12 The European Monetary System (1979 - ) 
The authorities' stress on the effective guilder exchange rate was initially continued at the start 
of the EMS. In September 1979 the guilder was again devalued vis a vis the mark by 2% 
(completing the third dvaluation against the mark within three years). Given this minor change 
in the central rate (within the EMS band) and the slight tendency of effective appreciation of 
the guilder before the realignment, the Netherlands Bank considered the consequences for the 
domestic price level as negligible (DNB Quarterly Report 1979/3, p. 60). 
After this realignment a policy reversal occured. Since then the monetary authorities 
stressed the confidence-aspect of a strong guilder. Because of the deterioration of the public 
finances much of the rising govemment deficit was absorbed abroad (i.e. foreigners purchasing 
government bonds on the Amsterdam capital market). Consequently, the policy makers 
demonstrated to be very aware of mamtaining international confidence in the external value of 
the guilder (DNB Annual Report 1980, p. 21). After the realignment in October 1981 the 
authorities were very clear;" then the Deutsche mark and the guilder revalued for the first (!) 
time by the same rate against the other currencies, to foster that ".... in the transition to a 
situation where the government deficit can be financed from domestic savings .... no harm 
should be done to the confidence in the guilder" (DNB Quarterly Report 1981/3, p. 39). With 
the same arguments the central bank opposed claims for a greater monetary financing of the 
government deficit (DNB Annual Report 1981, p. 26), while the Bank's president objected to 
claims to create some distance from the central rate of the Deutsche mark : " especially when 
the confidence in the guilder is not jeopardized, there is the opportunity to lower interest rates" 
(Duisenberg, 1982, p. 44). 
In conclusion, the end of the seventies marked a policy shift from stressing the 
effective exchange rate to a really fixed peg with the currency of the big neighbour Germany. 
Although we cannot detennine at this stage the precise moment, there is ample evidence the 
policy turnaround took place after the September 1979 realignment. Also Timmerman (1982, p. 
176), a former deputy directer of the Dutch central bank points to this: ".... In the autumn of 
1979 .... maintaining the external value of the guilder .... became all the more pressing .... A rea-
lignment of central rates in the EMS forced the Netherlands into an, albeit minor, devaluation 
of the guilder against the Deutsche mark. In order to prevent this from happening again, the 
policy was concentrated even more forcefully on securing a strong position for the guilder in the 
EMS". 
Table 3 Guilder-Deutsche mark exchange rates in the EMS *) 
March 1979 start EMS 
Sept. 1979 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 2% 
Oct. 1981 revaluation Deutsche mark plus guilder against all currencies 
June 1982 revaluation Deutsche mark plus guilder against all currencies 
March 1983 Deutsche mark revalues against guilder by 2% 
April 1986 revaluation Deutsche mark plus guilder against all currencies 
Jan. 1987 revaluation Deutsche mark plus guilder against all currencies 
*) We omitted minor realignments involving a single currency where, without exception, 
the guilder and the mark revalued by the same rate. 
In sum, since September 1979 Dutch exchange rate policy rests on two pillars: 
1 to secure a strong position for the guilder in the upper part of the EMS; 
2 to maintain confïdence in the central rate of the Deutsche mark by keeping it constant 
in EMS-realignments. 
This policy regime change was an important one, because as we showed in the Snake period the 
guilder stayed behind the mark every realignment when the mark was explicitly revalued. Second, 
the seventies witnessed long periods in which the guilder crept in the lower part of the EMS-
band (DNB Annual Reports). Third, as table 3 shows, the guilder devalued since September 
1979 one time only against the Deutsche mark. 
§ 3 Theory 
In economie literature the concept of credibility is not well defined. However, the essential 
meaning relates to the question: "Are (beliefs about) policy actions consistent with policy 
intentions? (see Blackburn & Christensen, 1989, McCallum, 1984). Rational people will evaluate 
the current course of policy to know if the government indeed sticks to its plans. To establish 
credibility the market participants have to be convinced that the monetary pohcy authorities give 
priority to, as our subject matter is concerned, its exchange rate objective, even when this would 
conflict with other aims of economie policy like combatting unemployment (DeGrauwe, 1989). 
Up to March 1983 Dutch policy makers did not deviate from their new regime (see 
table 3). It seems therefore natural to analyze whether this policy has been credible because, if 
so, the public believes the policy-makers are not going to renege and it consequently revises its 
expectations. If both aims of the new regime - i.e. a strong position for the guilder in the EMS 
and a fixed central rate with the mark - are being realized in the eyes of the public, this implies 
that exchange rate uncertainty and ditto expectations have changed. Uncovered guilder assets are 
now exposed to a lower exchange rate risk vis è vis the german mark. This leads to a lower 
premium to account for this risk i.e. a lower nominal interest rate differential with Germany. 
The credibility-hypothesis will thus imply that the strong-currency option will bring Dutch 
interest rates to a lower level. 
Figure 1 Money market rates in the Netherlands and in Germany 
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O The Netherlands + Germany 
From figure 1 it can clearly be seen that most of the time during the Snake the Dutch money 
market interest rate lay above its German counterpart. This applies also for the first two years 
of the EMS. From 1981 however, guilder interest rates are lower than mark interest rates, with 
the exception of the second half of 1981. We will analyze in the following to which extent the 
intensified Dutch exchange rate policy since 1979 contributed to this interest rate pattern. 
§ 4 Theoretical specification 
Because we are interested in a significant contribution of a credible exchange rate policy to the 
formation of interest rates, we specify a reduced form equation. We chose for the money market 
rate as the endogenous variabele because in the Netherlands the monetary authorities influence 
primarily short-time interest rates to safeguard the position of the guilder in the EMS (Den 
Dunnen, 1985). To this end the Netherlands Bank has a number of instruments at its disposal, 
like the official interest rates, quota's for the average recourse to the central bank4, short-term 
special loans not subject to the quota system and dollar swaps (Timmerman, 1982, p. 179). 
Because the Dutch money market is characterized by a structural shortage5, banks are heavily 
dependent on central bank borrowing. The Bank is therefore capable to exert a dominant 
influence on the money market rates if neccesary to maintain the external value of the guilder. 
Should the guilder for instance come under pressure in the foreign exchange market, money 
market conditions can quickly be tightened. Because the policy makers are in control of the 
market, we specify the following reaction function for the Netherlands Bank6: 
These quota's are fixed every three months for each bank. 
Since the middle of 1988 this shortage is maintained by money market cash reserves 
for the banks. 
See also the Bank's macroeconomic model called MORKMON (DNB, 1985). 
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+ - + + 
iNL = a0 + aj iD + a2 CA + a3 Dev + a4 Spec + A» (LI) 
Above the variabeles are shown the expected signs. The exogenous vanabeles, explained below, 
are considerations basic to the central bank policy in the money and foreign exchange markets. 
Given the orientation on the Deutsche mark the short-term German interest rate (i ) is not 
surprising. Further, if the Dutch current account balance (CA) shows a surplus, the monetary 
authorities try to export this via the capital account by lowering interest rates (Kessler, 1981). 
Moreover, the Netherlands Bank reacts to the actual guilder/Deutsche mark exchange rate 
(Dev). If the exchange rate of the mark rises (i.e. a depreciation of the guilder) in relation to 
the central rate, money market condition are tightened and interest rates will rise. Finally, the 
interest rate reaction of the central bank on speculative attacks on the guilder in the seventies is 
modelled by a dummy variabele (Spec). 
§ 5 Estimation 
From the outset empirical analysis of policy credibility mostly used the prediction error method, 
in which one considered model predictions of either the inflation rate, or the nominal interest 
rate or a vector of price inflation, wage inflation and output growth (see e.g. Cagan & Fellner, 
1983, Perry, 1983, Christensen, 1987, Giavazzi & Giovannini, 1989). It was argued that a 
disinflation poücy was credible if such predictions for instance overestimated the actual inflation 
rate during the new regime period, simply because these models were unable to take account of 
regime changes. Below we will perform this error prediction method for the Dutch money 
market rate. Also we will sustain our results by adding a dummy variabele which should capture 
the change in expectations resulting from the policy turn. However, as Christensen (1989) 
pointed out, only in the case the reduced form residuals are due solely to the absent credibility 
variabele, the prediction error method proves useful testing the credibility-hypothesis. Therefore 
we will in addition include the credibility variabele itself in the model, testing its significance. So 
we shall perform several methods for answering our basic question. In principle all these 
methods are able providing us with evidence not just about the credibility of the pursued policy, 
but also about its quantitative impact on interest rates and on any lag length between the policy 
reversal and the public's change in expectations. 
§ 5.1 Prediction error method 
Initially we estimated eq. 1.1 for the old regime, roughly coinciding with the Snake arrangement. 
We applied monthly figures, and to correct for first order serial correlation we estimated at this 
stage with a GLS procedure specifying the error term as an AR(1) process . In table 4 all 
coefficients show up to be significant (t-values between brackets); they also have the correct sign. 
Serial correlation could not be measured any more by reestimation of the equation 
using quarterly figures (see also DNB, 1985). Apparently, short-term processes exist 
which become irrelevant in longer intervals between the observations (see den Butter 
1976, Lütkepohl, 1987). 
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Table 4 Regression results for the Dutch money market rate 
iHL - cc0 + Oj ±D + a2 CA.3 + a3 Dev.3 + a4 Spec (1.1) 
1974:1-1979:9 1.79 1.0 -20.10 68.68 2.75 0.80 0.99 3.96 0.61 
(5.55) (-2.43) (4.25) (4.76) (5.94) 
1974sl-1976:12 1.92 1.0 -24.18 77.04 3.89 0.83 0.98 6.09 0.56 
(3.84) (-1.92) (3.52) (4.66) (3.34) 
1977:1-1979:9 1.79 1.0 -23.17 61.48 1.69 0.73 1.02 2.77 0.55 
(4.38) (-1.63) (2.40) (1.96) (3.35) 
1
 Box-Pierce portmanteau statistic for higher order serial correlation. 
jNL ^ p . incest
 r a t e s on three-month interbank deposits in the Netherlands and in Germany 
CA : scaled current account balance i.e. (X-M)M/(X+M) 
Dev : relative deviation Hfi/DM exchange rate in relation to the central rate, i.e. 
(exchange rate Deutsche mark-central rate Deutsche mark)/central rate 
Spec : dummy to account for extremely high interest rates during speculation against the 
guilder 
The coëfficiënt of the Gennan interest rate has been restricted to one (in the estimation results 
it was not significantly different from one). Therefore eq. 1.1 can be seen as an explanation of 
the Dutch-German interest rate differential. To get some insight into the stability of the 
coefficients, we present also results for two subperiods. The relation appears to be stable. On 
the basis of the coefficients we predicted the money market rate for the period October 1979-
February 1983. We dehberately put an end to the sample period just before the March 
realignment of 1983, where the guilder devalued quite surprisingly against the Deutsche mark by 
2%. Of course this event might be interpreted by financial market participants as a classical 
example of cheating. So for the new regime to be consistent we should drop this out of the 
sample. Later on (§ 5.4) we will adress this important matter again. If our reduced form model 
overpredicts systematically the interest rate in the new regime, we will tend to conclude the 
intensified exchange rate policy has had a downward shifting effect on market expectations 
regarding the exchange rate risk on the guilder. 
In figure 2 the actual interest rates are compared with the predicted ones. 
Figure 2 Actflal and predicted Dutch money market rate according to eq. 1.1 
• actual + predicted 
It is clear that, especially since 1981, there are systematic overpredictions of actual interest rates. 
Moreover, these overpredictions tend to rise approaching the end of the prediction period (see 
table 5). This could mean that credibUity has to develop. This is in line with learning behaviour 
and is also found in empirical research (see e.g. Christensen, 1989, Hardouvelis & Barnhart, 
1989). Although we now have a first indication of the new regime being credible, we have to 
confirm it by other methods because prediction errors could relate to a lot of other factors. 
Table 5 Actual and predicted Dutch money market rate 
actual 
ea. 1.1 
predicted forecast 
interest interest error 
rate rate 
period (1) (2) d)-(2) 
1980 10.69 11.33 -0.64 
1981 11.59 13.55 -1.96 
1982 8.37 9.88 -1.51 
1979 Oct-
1983 Feb 10.11 11.48 -1.37 
last 12 months 7.48 9.07 -1.59 
last 9 months 7.09 8.73 -1.64 
last 6 months 6.20 7.89 -1.69 
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§ 52 Dummy variabele metfaod 
To test for the significance of the forementioned overestimates eq. 1.2 presents our equation fit 
through 1983.02, with a dummy variabele Cred added for 1981.01 and afterwards (we also added 
a dummy Mon to account for the unanticipated German monetary tightening in the beginning 
of 1981). 
i"L - 1.57 + 1.0 iD - 15.75 CA., + 64.76 Dev_3 + 
(6.16) (-2.86) (5.11) 
+ 2.58 Spec - 1.75 MonD - 1.20 Cred (1.2) 
(6.31) (-2.53) (-2.58) 
R2 - 0.83 SE - 0.85 
Cred - 1: since 1981.01 
Cred - Os elsewhere 
Eq. 1.2 gives satisfactory over-all results. Further, the dummy Cred differs significantly from zero 
and has the correct sign. At this stage we can conclude that our policy credibility dummy 
contributes significantly to the explanation of the interest rate differential since 1981. Subse-
quently we let the dummy start in several months to obtain an indication of the time-lag 
preceding the shift in expectations (see table 6). Given the insignifïcance of the dummy variabele 
since 1982.01 we conclude that the credibility of the Dutch monetary authorities might be 
established before 1982. However we cannot reject the hypothesis the new exchange rate policy 
gained credibility from its very start (i.e. October 1979). 
Finally, we also have some insight in the quantitative impact of the new regime: short-
term interest rates are 1.2% point lower than otherwise would have occured. This harmonizes 
more or less with the outcomes in table 5. In the next section we will try to sustain this 
evidence by using an alternative method that takes exphcitly account of the policy credibility 
variabele. 
Q(23) - 12.45 p - 0.63 
(8.04) 
SMPL: 1974.01 - 1983.02 . 
Table 6 Regression results for Cred alternatives 
starting coëfficiënt t-value R2 SE Q(23) 
period 
• 
1979.10 -1.17 (-2.77) 0.83 0.84 11.38 
1980.07 -1.23 (-2.76) 0.83 0.85 12.52 
1981.01 -1.20 (-2.58) 0.83 0.85 12.45 
1982.01 -0.73 (-1.11) 0.83 0.86 10.73 
§ 53 Direct estimation of policy credibility 
Methods we employed up till now are indirect tests of the credibility-hypothesis. Empirical 
research taking account of a direct estimation method can be found for instance in Baxter 
(1985), Christensen (1989), Hardouvelis & Barnhart (1989). With respect to a reduced form 
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equation direct estimation boils down to include a variabele representing policy credibility in the 
model and testing its significance. When examining the existence of credibility and reputation 
effects Blackbum & Christensen (1989, p. 36) point out one should be aware of the following 
issues. First, in addition to the usual problems created by expectations variabeles, we have now 
non tangible concepts that may raise difficulties. One has to obtain a proxy for these concepts, 
in which case any results are subject to the appropriateness of this proxy. Second, the theoretical 
literature indicates that credibility is likely to be time dependent. Buiter & Miller (1983) make 
the distinction between announcement effects - the immediate effects of an announced regime 
change - and result effects - the effects after proposed plans have been realized. Finally, the 
theoretical models put forward by Barro & Gordon (1983a, 1983b) and Backus & Driffill (1985) 
are far too stylized and simple to be of use in empirical work. Or, as Giavazzi & Giovannini 
(1989, p. 111) put it, discussing the two country-model of Canzoneri & Henderson: " (this) 
model is silent on the question of credibility of the exchange rate targets". 
Bearing all those questions in mind we proceed by incorporating in our model a 
variabele which captures the new policy since the autumn of 1979. We therefore have to model 
one of the two piüars of that new policy (see § 2.2). At first we focus on the relative duration 
of the position of the guilder in the upper part of the EMS band. The longer the guilder 
"floates" in this upper 1.125% area of the EMS band, the more fïnancial market participants will 
consider the Dutch currency as strong. As a consequence market expectations will change in 
favour of the guilder. This policy will therefore gain reputation, as the exchange rate risk on the 
guilder vis a vis the Deutsche mark is perceived to be lower. As a result the money market 
interest rate differential between the Netherlands and Gennany will narrow. So to sustain high 
credibility a strong position of the guilder on the foreign exchange market becomes negatively 
correlated with the interest rate differential. Our policy variabele for a given month thus 
amounts to the relation between the number of months past since the start of the new regime 
(October 1979) in which the guilder took a top position in the EMS band, and the total number 
of months past. 
First we tested the hypothesis that the intensified exchange rate policy gained 
credibility from the outset. Although the coëfficiënt had the correct negative sign, it was not 
significant at a 95% confidence interval. Other specifications did not change that picture8. We 
assumed therefore that the new regime did not lead immediately to a shift in market expectati-
ons. So we did not find any support for the announcement effects. Probably the monetary policy 
makers should stick to their new regime for some time, before they can establish credibility. So 
we used the same pohcy credibiüty variabele again but now assigning to it the value zero from 
October 1979 until January 1981 (the last period has been suggested by the evidence presented 
in §§ 2.2 and 5.1). Equation 13 gives the results: 
i"1 - 1.07 + 1.0 i° - 16.77 CA_« + 68.80 Dev.3 + 
(6.10) (-3.20) (6.68) 
+ 2.81 Spec - 2.19 MonD - 1.05 Top810l 
(4.92) (-4.83) (-3.41) (1.3) 
R2 - 0.87 SE - 0.53 DW - 1.62 Q(12) - 7.80 
SMPLJ 1979.10 - 1983.02 . 
The credibility variabele Top8101 has as we expected a negative sign and is significant. The other 
statistics are also satisfying. Because serial correlation is not an issue here we tend to conclude 
the variabele Top was indeed an omitted explanatory variabele. To get an impression about the 
lag-length between the policy turnaround and the shift in expectations we let the variabele Top 
start from several months. From table 7 it can be seen that since October 1980 the credibility 
variabele contributes significantly to the formation of interest rates. Besides, it appears Dutch 
Neither the inflation rates in the Netherlands and in Gennany, nor the interest rate 
differential between the US and Gennany appeared to be significant. 
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monetary policy makers established a reputation before 1982. The impact of the reputation 
gained on the Dutch money market interest rates can be calculated as about 1% point. Further, 
several Granger-causality tests have been performed which do not indicate that simultaneity is an 
issue here . In this respect DNB (1985) and Eijffinger & In 't Veld (1987) reported similar 
outcomes. 
Table 7 Regression results for Top alternatives 
coëfficiënt 
starting 
period 
1979. ,10 -0. .52 
1980, ,10 -1, .02 
1980. ,11 -1, .07 
1980. ,12 -1, .12 
1981. .01 -1, .05 
1981, ,02 -1, .18 
1982, .01 -0, .25 
Next, we were interested to find out if focussing on the second cornerstone of the new exchange 
rate policy - keeping the guilder/Deutsche mark central rate constant - would provide us with 
corresponding results. The longer this central rate is kept constant, the more credible it becomes 
in the eyes of the markets. Therefore we calculated, for every month, the relation between the 
number of months since the new regime in which the central rate of the mark did not change, 
and the total number of months past since the EMS took off in March 1979. We included this 
altemative policy credibility variabele Par into our model. The best results were obtained with 
eq. (1.4): 
iH L - 1.13 + 1.0 iD - 12.59 CA.3 + 72.30 Dev_3 + 
(3 .81) ( -1 .91) (4 .24) 
+ 2 . 2 9 Spec - 1.33 P a r 8 1 0 1 
(3-84) ( -2 .81) (1 .4 ) 
R2 - 0.83 SE - 0.62 Q ( l l ) - 9.61 p - 0.42 
(2.70) 
SMPL: 1979.10 - 1983.02 . 
Several tests have been done of the following equations (see Harvey, 1981, p. 303): 
j j 
Top8101t = f( 2 Difft j , 2 Top8101 t. ) j = 1,..,6 . 
i = l i = l 
The variabele Diff is the short-term interest rate differential between the Netherlands 
and Germany. No single F-test showed a significant effect of the Diff variabeles 
together, although several lag structures have been tried. 
t-value average tT SE DW Q(12) 
impact on 
interest rates 
(Z point) 
(-0.75) 0.83 0.61 1.47 6.31 
(-3.05) 0.87Z 0.87 0.55 1.40 21.65 
(-3.27) 0.91Z 0.87 0.54 1.50 18.65 
(-3.69) 0.95Z 0.88 0.52 1.42 17.50 
(-3.41) 0.90Z 0.87 0.53 1.62 7.80 
(-4.20) l.OOZ 0.89 0.50 1.45 6.90 
(-0.78) 0.83 0.61 1.50 6.75 
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It is clear that these results support those of table 7. Also the credibility variabele Pargl01 is 
significant and has the right sign. Next, we calculated its impact on Dutch money market rates, 
being about 1.2% point; experiments with starting months other than January 1981 led to similar 
results. So in the last months of 1980 (one year after the policy reversal) the variabele shows up 
to be significant. 
We can conclude from this section that the tightened exchange rate policy provided the 
Dutch monetary policy makers with credibility on financial markets. By sticking to their intended 
policy financial markets put their trust in them. After all, since September 1979 the guilder was 
without exception revalued together with the Deutsche mark during sometimes turbulent foreign 
exchange developments. Moreover, the position of the guilder in the EMS continued to be 
strong. As a consequence Dutch money market rates became more attractive as the perceived 
foreign exchange risk diminished while the interest rate differential with Germany initially 
remained the same. The resulting upward pressure on the guilder induced the Netherlands Bank 
to lower its dealing rates with the market, paving the way for declining money market rates. A 
new equilibrium was thus regained between a lower perceived exchange rate risk and a lower 
interest rate differential. 
Table 8 summerizes the quantitative impact of the four methods applied in this paper 
on the money market rates. We can conclude from this table that all four methods used to 
analyze the policy credibility of the Dutch monetary authorities show a convergence of results, 
which adds to the latter's robustness. 
Table 8 Summary quantitative impact of policy credibility on interest rates 
prediction dummy direct estimation 
error variabele policy credibility 
method method _______________ 
Top Par 
average impact 
on interest rates 1.7Z 1.3Z 1.0Z 1.2Z 
§ 5.4 Was the March 1983 realignment seen as cheating? 
As a complete surprise the guilder was devalued by 2% against the mark in March 1983. The 
initiative came from the former Secretary of Finance Onno Ruding. The Netherlands Bank 
advised the par value of the Deutsche mark should be unchanged. However, the Law of the 
Exchange Rate gjves the government the last word. During the realignment negociations it 
became clear Germany wanted for politica! reasons to revalue at a higher rate than might have 
been expected on economie fundamentals. Therefore the Dutch government decided maintaining 
the par value of the mark was not possible (DNB Quarterly Report 1983/1). The Netherlands 
Bank finally agreed with the government decision, but only to keep together the european 
exchange rate system. With some threat the Bank added the devaluation should be considered as 
once-only (ibid. p. 14). 
In the following we will try to analyze if this unanticipated devaluation raised the 
Dutch interest rate level. Also we will try to fmd out if the monetary policy makers lost their 
credibility. On the basis of eq. (13) we produced figure 3, making use of die prediction error 
method. 
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Figure 3 Actual and predicted interest rate according to eq. (13) 
* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I M I I I I I I I I I I I I I 
7 9 1 0 8 0 0 1 8 0 0 6 S 1 0 I 8 1 0 6 6 2 0 1 8 2 0 6 8 3 0 1 9 3 0 6 8 4 0 1 
Q actual + predicted 
It can be clearly seen that after the Maren 1983 realignment the predicted interest rate 
systematically overestimates its actual course. This deviation amounts to over 0.4% in the period 
April 1983-March 1984, and it amounts to even 0.6% in the period April 1983-November 1983. 
More or less the same results were obtained applying the prediction error method to eq. (1.4). 
Next, we tried to support this evidence of a mark-up on the interest rate by adding a dummy to 
the model, representing the loss in credibility. This appeared to be the case. In eq. (1.5) the 
variabele "Incred" represents this loss in credibility in terms of percentage point increase in the 
interest rate. 
iHL - 1.11 + 1.0 iD - 14.59 CA
 4 + 67.56 Dev 3 + 
(7.11) (-3.41) (7.15) 
+ 2.85 Spec - 2.10 MonD - 1.17 Top8101 + 0.58 Incred (1.5) 
(5.38) (-5.19) (-4.54) (2.85) 
R2 - 0.86 SE - 0.49 DW - 1.55 Q(12) - 9.94 
Incred - 1: 1983.04 - 1983.11 
Incred - 0: elsewhere SMPL: 1979.10 - 1984.03 . 
From eq. (1.5) it can be infered that the confïdence of the financial markets in the Dutch 
exchange rate policy diminished immediately after the devaluation, for the variabele Incred is 
significant and has the correct sign. However, confïdence did not vanish. After all, the policy 
credibility variabele Top continues to be significant. So we can say that the unexpected Maren 
devaluation of the guilder vis è vis the mark produced a mark-up on the Dutch interest rate 
amounting to about 0.6% for more than half a year. The same experiment using eq. (1.4) led to 
a similar result (i.e. a mark-up of 0.7%). Although the combined effect of Topg101 and Incred 
on the intet est rate remains negative (thus the policy being still credible), its impact was 
diminished temporarily to about 0.4%. We can conclude from this that credibility needs not to 
be lost completely if the pohcy makers renege on their plans, i.e. if they are cheating the public. 
This has also been put forward by Blackbum & Christensen (1989) and found empirically for 
the United States by Hardouvelis & Barnhart (1989). Moreover, after roughly half a year 
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exchange rate policy credibility was reestablished. With respect to the latter the following 
"Dutch-specific" factors played an important part. 
At first, the devalued guilder did not imply a policy reversal of the joined monetary 
authorities. The Netherlands Bank, which can be compared with the Bundesbank as independen-
ce is concerned, was against the decision to devalue and made no secret of this see (DNB 
Quarterly Report 1983/1). But also the Secretary of Finance declared before Parliament the 
Dutch exchange rate continued unabated to stability in the EMS (ibid. p. 18). 
Second, the central bank brought into action its full money market and foreign 
exchange market instruments to underline its determination to defend the guilder which, not 
surprisingly, came at that time under pressure. For instance the discount rate was raised, 
tightening dollarswaps were announced and almost one-third of the foreign exchange reserves 
were sold (DNB Annual Report 1983, p. 91-95). 
Finally, the fact that the government too stressed the one-shot character of the 
devaluation before Parliament was of overriding importance (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1982-
1983). 
§ 6 Discussion 
The last years much empirical research has been carried out presenting evidence of a shift in 
expectations prompted by the assumed disciplining feature of the EMS. For instance Christensen 
(1987, 1989) reported results for Denmark indicating the Danish exchange rate policy gained 
credibility since the beginning of 1983. Giavazzi & Giovannini (1989) too observed for Denmark 
a change in expectations finding that the actual rates of wage and of price inflation were 
overpredicted. 
For France the evidence is mixed. Giavazzi & Giovannini found a significant change in 
parameter stability after the beginning of the EMS. By contrast they were unable to detect such 
a change in correspondence with the French policy turnaround of the spring of 1983. These 
authors note however this result might be related to a low power for the parameter stability 
tests. Weber (1988) could not find an apparent influence of the EMS on the French counterin-
flation reputation. 
For Italy the evidence seems to point in the same direction. Weber (1988) found an 
increase in Italy's counterinflation reputation after the June 1985 realignment, whereas Giavazzi 
& Giovannini (1989) reported Italian evidence of an adjustment in inflation expectations in the 
second quarter of the same year. 
With respect to the Irish economy, Dornbusch (1989) observed a change in expectati-
ons in the fall of 1982, as a result of the policy turnaround in the preceding summer. Although 
bond market evidence suggested immediate credibility, the Irish programme failed in terms of 
public finance and employment. 
As far as we know, only Weber (1988) analyzed the Netherlands too. Our results hold 
up his assertion the gains in Dutch reputation have been the outcome of a strong commitment 
to lower inflation rates and therefore to lower interest rates. Evidence presented in this paper 
does not support Weber's result the Netherlands had the same counterinflation reputation as 
Germany at the beginning of the EMS. If that would be the case, it would be difficult to explain 
significant differences in interest rate levels. In fact, German short-term and long-term interest 
rates were in 1979 on average lower than those in the Netherlands: 2.8% and 1.5% respectively. 
However, we should be very careful by making such a comparison. Besides other differences, 
Weber used a different reputation measure (i.e. a built-up of anti-inflation reputation by 
updating inflation expectations affected by the actual inflation rates) while we focused on the 
credibility of the exchange rate policy as reflected in interest rates. 
Although we presented additional evidence in favour of the EMS credibility-hypothesis 
we did not analyze whether the Dutch disinflation policy has been more efficiënt in terms of 
output lost compared with a floating exchange rate regime. In fact, the european evidence is not 
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in favour of the hypothesis that the costs of disinflation were lower in EMS countries than 
outside the system (see Dornbusch, 1989, DeGrauwe, 1990). While there are serious difficulties 
to construct models for one regime and simulate them for another, we argue the costs of 
disinflation in the Netherlands may have been lower. First, one should not play down the 
importance of significant lower interest rates for government finance and for the business sector. 
For instance a 1% point sustained fall in short-tenn and in long-term interest rates leads to a 
reduction of the interest rate burden for both sectors of about 1.3% GDP (DNB Annual Report 
1982). This would mean that fiscal restraint could be less severe and that the business sector 
might move earlier out of the depression. We can hardly imagine the Dutch achieving these 
disinflation advantages outside the EMS. 
Second, DeGrauwe (1990) pointed out that countries with a high inflation and a low 
reputation at the start of the EMS were more constrained than for instance the Netherlands in 
their disinflation strategies. Because those countries could not produce a steep overvaluation of 
their currencies using a shock therapy as applied by the US and the UK, they were forced to 
follow more gradual and mild deflation policies, stretched out over many years in order to break 
inflation expectations. As a result inflation was slower in coming down. 
By contrast, Weber (1988) and the evidence presented in this paper confirm the view 
the Dutch monetary policy makers enjoyed a good reputation at the start of the EMS, implying 
that a disinflation policy might have prompted a quick shift in expectations. This is to indicate 
that further research along these lines is pressing. 
§ 7 Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we applied the credibility-hypothesis to the Netherlands' exchange rate policy. Since 
the EMS-realignment in September 1979 Dutch exchange rate policy has been intensified. The 
policy is now to keep the guilder in the upper part of the EMS parity-grid. Moreover, Dutch 
monetary authorities now aim for an unchanged central rate with the Deutsche mark. According 
to the credibility-hypothesis such a policy, if maintained, will be fruitful and leading to a lower 
premium for currency risk on the guilder vis è vis the D-mark. This will translate into a lower 
level of Dutch interest rates. 
By means of two indirect and two direct estimation methods we tried to analyze the 
credibility of the new exchange rate policy. The credibility-hypothesis was supported by the data. 
Moreover, we found a convergence of results; after one year this pohcy led to a significant and 
permanent cut in money market rates, amounting to about T/4%. Further, the public turned out 
to react to policy results, not merely to policy announcements. 
We also analyzed if the unanticipated devaluation of the guilder vis a vis the DM in 
the March 1983 realignment was seen as cheating. We found evidence it was. This devaluation 
damaged immediately, albeit not completely and only temporarily, the Dutch authorities' 
reputation. We found evidence of a mark-up on the interest rate during half a year of over 
0.6%. 
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